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FOREWORD 
The workshop at which these papers were originally presented 
came about through reasons of serendipity. We, the three 
principal authors, met by virtue of our all holding Jean 
Monnet Research Fellowships at the European University 
Institute, 1988-89. We discovered that we had a common 
interest in responses to societal demands which could not 
adequately be accounted for by the familiar State and Market 
models. The Workshop (whose stated purpose we reproduce 
below) was organized to air questions, ideas and findings, 
and to invite critical comment from colleagues within and 
from outside the Institute. 
"The purpose of the workshop is to discuss Non State and Non 
Market activities in response to societal demands. These 
activities have collectively been referred to as the Third 
Sector, which encompasses a range of Non Governmental 
Organizations whose prime purpose is not the acquisition of 
profits as a result of activities in the market. Thus, for 
example, in the fields of international aid, the production 
and distribution of culture, and local economic development 
we have witnessed the emergence of just 
with accompanying alternative policy 
such organizations 
processes. Indeed 
there is much evidence to suggest that in these and in other 
policy areas, national governments and the EC are making 
increasing efforts to offer scope to this Third Sector in 
their own policy practices 
These developments, and the associated selective 
inadequacies and failures of more conventional State and 
Market mechanisms, have attracted the attention of 
specialists in the fields of economics, law, political 
science and sociology. Our intention is to bring together 
these different analytical approaches in order to create a 
broad perspective on a number of questions, for instance; 
(i) what explains the emergence of the Third Sector? 
iv 
(ii) what are the particular capacities and constraints 
which the Third Sector offers in contrast to simple 
State or Market mechanisms? 
(iii)what are the relative achievements of Third Sector 
activities? 
(iv) to what extent does the Third Sector complement, 
duplicate, replace, or compete with State or Market 
actors? 
Clearly it would be too ambitious to expect to resolve such 
issues in one day! The intention is then that the Workshop 
will constitute a catalyst for further inte;-disciplinary 
inquiry and discussion." 
We would be pleased to hear from any readers with similar 
interests, and/or with criticisms. Correspondence should be 
via our home institutions (see addresses in the Contributors 
section). 
LB, MG, and JM. 
Florence, 1989. 
Introduct·i on 
Gi anclomen·i eo Majonr,·~ 
The key question for a theory of <private! nonprof·i t or• ''th·i Pcl 
sEctOT"' 11 ·j nst·i tut·i on~; ·j s why or•gani zati ons of th·i ~:; typP. emt-~r'rJ£~ .~t: 
·in an env·i ronment wh·i eh proovi de~;; i n;;ti tuti on a·! 
for prof·i t f·i rms and i:JU!"'£<auc:roat 1 c: <HJf!l"lC:"i r>.s. A<; 
the paperos ·i ne"! ucled in th·i <; pul:d ·i cation makte cl f<al', the an~;;Wf<l"''; 
given to th·i '' quest·i on vaPy ac:c:or·d·i IHJ to tiH!. cl·i sci p"l ·i nary 
I:Jackgroud of the author and to the field of activity beinA 
·i nve·;;-,ti gat eel. 
·i n,:,t·i tut·i on a! forms that any roeasonai:Jle definition of the third 
sector wot.t"l d ·i nc:l ucle, one may doubt whether' any <Jf<I1Bl'ill t h BOI'Y, 
comparable to the economic theory of the firm or the Webe!'ian 
theory of bureaucracy, is possible in this area. FoP a ·1 "I ·1 ts 
r::,mpi p·i ea·! 1··i chness and theort!.t·i ca·l ~;ophi st·i cat·i ()11 1 th(~. ·i tt::T"'i:itur•e 
on the nonprofit sector has not yet pl"'oduced models of great 
!.JPnl).J',J·!·i ty. It ·is quite pos,;i !J"I e that ct·i f·ferent exp"l anati ons wi I ·1 
have to be worked out for different cases. 
Hot.JE:V(~r·J 
attempt to identify structural elements common to all, or <Jt 
·least to many, nonppofit institut·i<Hl!>. Profe!;siona"li':,m ap!H:cH'S to 
• Director, European Policy Unit, EUI, Florence 
be once such common e·\ f!.mt'-nt. It is a fact that many nonprofit 
organizations of the service type are 
proof<~ssi ona·l ~:;. It is a·\ s<> tPue that ·j n m<>t advanced i ndustl"i al 
societies the i nc:Peasi ntJ Pat: f.~ o1~ prooff.~~:;s·i on(ll ·i zat·i on has 
accompanied by an impressive gPowth of the nonprofit sector. As I 
arg~ed a few years ago CMajorle, 1984), these two develcpments may 
be causally !"elated: the fact that many professionals choose to 
wor"k in nonprofit organizations at ·1 (!.ast pr··i m a ·fac·i f.~ 
evidence that these institutions may be successful in reducing 
the conflict between a ppofessional orientation, on the one hand, 
and the immanent logic of either for-profit or bureaucratic 
opganizations, on the other'. 
Th·i s confl i et i ~; a recur•pent theme ·in the '\ ·i teratur•e de a·\ i ng 
with organizations and the professions, yet 
conceptual 1 ·in I< 
an 
and 
exp·l·icit 
nonproof·i t 
organization has appaPently never been forged. Most analyses of 
the stPa·i ns and accomodations and 
ororJani zat:i on~:; have focused on private for-proofit enterpr··i ~:;r:~s ()f'l 
on public bureaucracies, with nonproofit oroganizations, at best, 
seen as a roesidual category. Given the dominance of pl"ofessionals 
in most service nonprofits, this bias is Pather surprising. 
In fact, many featu!"es that are generally considePed to be 
specific charoacteroistics of the professions autonomy, altruism~ 
and 
anti-bureaucratic ethos havr:. al ~;;o been ~;i IHJl ed out, q u·i tr:. 
·independently, as thr:. ra·i son d' f!.troe of nonppo·l'i t i nst:i tuti ons. 
Proofessions and nonproofits have each been praised as positive 
fof'Cf!.S ·j n soci a·l deve·l opmr,nt, ,,tand·i ng against tiH:. exce,;se~; of 
both profi t····dP·i vten ·i nd·i vi clual·i ~;m ant:\ bureauc:Pati c coli ect·i vi sm. 
t E~T"lllS, 
VI 
1 a ck of accountatl'i l·i ty, ·j n '' f f ·j c ·i en c y, and 
exploitation of the consumer. 
The P••ral'\ e·l·i sm of 
pr'ofr:.ssi on a·\ ism and nonprofi ts 'iU9!ltests that the ~';oc i ol O!Ji r:al 
nonppofit organization, which at first sight seem to 
to f!.il c h 
other' to ca'll for a theopy Pe·l at·i ng them. T\H, theof'y pf'l"sented ·in 
the paper cited above IMajone, 1984) focuses on the 
r:o ntr'O 1 ., ·in !.'1 and E~valuati ng pPof~?.ssi ona·l wor>k. Proo"f"es;s·i ona·l s ·in 
foro-profit oPganizations must submit to the control of a 
who is motivated to overoule them whenever their decisions come 
into con'f·i ·i et: w·i th th<'- !;Joa·l of prof·i t max·i m·i zati on. Burt<aucrati c 
on the other hand, ~:;tp(:~~:;s ppc:~cli c:tc1bi ·t·i ty of 
results and adherence to rules i.IS thf!. OVI"r'r'i d·j ng 
eva·l uat·i on and contr'ol. 
work 
G·i ven the obi ec:t·i ve d·i ffi cu·l ty of moni tof'i IHJ proo·f'ess·i on a I 
and the imporotance of ppofessional autonomy, nonprofit 
organizations are on the whole superior froom the point of view of 
ppof'(:!~;s·i onal 
to cef'ta·i n characteristics of nonpPofits that affect the 
management control process in those organizations: the absence of 
the ppofit measure; the difficulty of measuroing pepforomanc:e and 
the limited role of market fopces; and the 
absence of a well-defined chain of authority. 
Thus, other th·i ng•; be·i nrJ equal, nonppofi t wi ·1·1 be favoPr:d by 
opgani Zf!.d 
evc,ntuall y 
cPaft. 
c\i spl dCe 
T hi !o 
a ·11 
oPgani Zt:lti on, Rath(~P ~ 
pf'incipal'\y comm·itted to s; () f' h BP 
does not mean that nonproofits wil 
oth E<f' types of o·f 
d·i f'f<~T'ent or~1an·i Zdt·] on a·! mod r:.s wi ·11 
continue to coexist and to appeal to different segments of the 
pr•o·i'r,ss·i onal popu·r at·i on. 
Any improvement in the match between type organization, 
method of control, and attitudes toward work can only lead to an 
·i nc:rease in social eff'i c·i ency. As the aut hoPs of the fo·r ·r ow·i n[l 
papers emphasize, a 1 be ·it in diffePent ways, the existence of a 
healthy thiPd sector, between maPket and state, is an f.~ssenti al 
ouP soci t~t:i {~5, 
Reference 
and 
Or<gani zat·i on<::;, 
. Jo uro n a ·1 of I-leal th Po'l i t·i cs, Pol i cv and Law, vo·l . 
VIII 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION 
IN TI-lE F'F~IJDLICTI ot'l AND DI STR I BUT! ON OF CUL Tllf':E 
Dr~ L~once Bekemans 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of my contribution is to sufnmarize our kr1owledge on 
the role of the nonprofit organization in the production and 
distribution of culture. This is done frotn an economics 
standpoint. The discussion is set in the framework of the limits 
and possibilities of the appli.Cc\t.iorl of a ,;cienti·fic (economic) 
approach to a sector determined by creativity and diversity. We 
are in the territory of cultural economics. 
By cul tun?., a ver-y slippery concept, I mean symbolic works 
produced in for-mally c:n-~Janizecl sectot-!=.; o·f th(:? economy, i. f:? .. 
materials produced for an audience and distributed through 
established channels. In other words, to 
institutionalized culture, i.e .. the forms of culture that are 
produced and d i !5tl". i buted "'i th a ,--esorti ng tu ·for· mal on;) ani zc~ti ons 
or mar·kets. l'Jit.l1in the domain of in,;titutionalized culture, the 
focus lies rnerely or1 tt1e arts ir1 the broad sense of the word. 
In my presentation limit myse.l f to an over-view of the 
(conceptual) economic E:>:plan{:·:d:.:i.ons of nonprofit or .. ganizt:~:tions and 
their applications to the production and distribution of culture, 
with ,;ome indications for possible research. Two questions can be 
dealt with: 1. What is the explanation for the varying prevalence 
of the nonprofit enterprise among different cultural industries 
in the production and distribution of culture? 2. l~ha·t wi 11 be 
the bel1avioural consequer1ces :i.f cultural organizations are 
nonprofit as opposed to profit-seeking? 
.pa 
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I. Intr-oduction: th;=- economic:;<; o-f nonpr-c:J-fi.t Dn]clnizations 
Ser-ious wor-k on the economics of the nonpr-ofit sector- began in 
the ear-ly 1970s IHan~nann 1987; Powell 1987; Rose-Ac:ker-man 1986; 
Salamon 1987; Weisbr-od 1977 and 19881. Br-oadly speaking, in the 
past few years two formal econrunic theories have been advanced 
to explairl the existence of tt1e nonprofit sector~ 
1. the public: goods theory 
This theot•·y ccmsi der·s the~ li?:-: i. stence of thr= r·Jonrwof it sector- as 
the combined pr-oduct of market failur-e and gover-nment failur-e, 
i .. e. of inhPr-ent limitation•;<; in both the mat···ket and t1·1e 
government as pr·ovide,~s o·f collective goods IWeisbrud 19771. 
Collective goods ar-e pr-oducts ur- services which, once they at··e 
produced, ar-e enjoyed by all people whether- they have paid for-
them or- not. Pr-oviding such guuds exclusively thr-ough the mar-ket 
will ensur-e that they are in small supply since few conswner-s 
will voluntarily pay for products they could enJoy without having 
to pay. With the mar-ket demand being low, producer-s will produce 
less of these goods ur services than the public really needs or 
~~ants. Thi«; pn~blt?.m is ccHnmonly r·eferT;c>d to as the "free rider·" 
problem, and in traditional economic thecwy it serves as the 
major rationale for government intervention. Since government can 
tax people for producing collective goods, it c«~n over·cCJme this 
mar-ket f<olilurP. 
r 
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However, the goverflmerlt, too, has certain inherent limitations as 
a producpr of collectivP gCJCJds. It is tnost important to consider 
that in a dPmCJcratic sociPty it will pr-oduce only that range and 
quantity of collectivP goCJds having a majCJr-ity suppCJrt. This 
will of course lead to son1e demands not being met. 
demands for collPctive gCJCJds a nonpr-ofit sectCJr 
To meet such 
According to the theory, nonprofit organizations tt1ere·Fore exist 
to supply a range of collective goods desired by a segn1ent of 
community but not by a majority. In other wor-ds, nonprofi. t 
organizations provide collective goads and are ·financed by 
voluntary donations from peoplP dissatisfied wi.th the low levels 
of government activi.ty. Al::: a r·esul t, the more dj_verse the 
community is, the mCJre extensive the nonprofit sPctor it is 
likely to have, will be. 
2. ThP contract failure thPCJry 
The second bt'-oad theor .. y on thf.= rlonpt-uf it. ~;F.0C tor·· E~t tr··i but(~?.::s the 
e>~istencr.~ o-f nonpl·-ofit cw·ganizations to a cliffet···erlt kind nf 
markPt failt.we, i.e. contr-act failurP and infDrmation asymmetry 
IHansmann 1981 and 19871. This theor-y emphasizps thP tasks which 
nonprofit organizations can perform br2tter than prCJfit-sePking 
firms. The cPntr-al notion is that in the casP of some goods and 
'services, the put-chaser is not the same as the consumer. In these 
circumstances, the normal mechanisms nf the mar-kpt, which involvP 
consumer ct1oice on the basis of adequate informatior1, do nut 
apply. 
5 
Nonprofit organiz~tions will arise in situations where the 
consumers feel unable to accurately evaluate the quantity and the 
quality of the product or service. On account of the distribution 
constraint i.e. it prohibits the distribution of residual 
earnings to persons who exercise control over the firml, the non 
profit organization offers the consumers the advantage of the 
provision of higher quality services. 
Nonprofit organizations as a group share at least two basic 
character i sti. cs: L they do not earn pecuniary return on 
invested capita~~ and 2. tt1ey claim to serve some social purpose. 
The significant point is that the objectives ~f the typical nDn 
profit organization are by their very nature designed to keep the 
organization constantly on the brink of financial catastrophe; 
for such a group, 
an end in itself. 
the quality of the services it provides becomes 
Nor only through its quality aspirations do the social goals of 
the nonpr··u·f it Pnter~pr~i :~:;.e cuntr·i bute to its ·financial 
contributions. The concern of the typical nonprufit organization 
for the size and composition of its clientele often CC:\USeS 
operating revenue to be lower than if services would be priced to 
achieve a simple profit-maximization goal. In short, a low price 
~or the product of a nonprofit group is normally an inevitable 
consequence of its objectives. 
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The desire to proyide a product of as high a quality as possible 
and to dist1··i.bute the product in a miHHler .. other·· than that 1•Jhicl1 
m a!-: i mi zt-::s r~evenue, cr-eates .r.:tnother- unusui~\l !:.:;.i t:uat i Dn. For ~.;ucl1 dn 
enterprise a substantial increase in the de111and for its product 
may well ~"\lot·-sE:~n the ot-,J~":":\niz.E:\tic:Jn~s ·finartcial he(::\lth~ f.in :inc::r-1:=-!:1~5\·:·~·cJ 
numbet- o·f orc:l·lr=~::.tri::tl pE:~~·-·fur .. mancl?.~:::. rni~\Y ~-'JE~ll increi::\SE-? the sizE~ u·f 
the contributions required for solvency. 
II. Data-setting 
It is apparent that all of the standard problems of nonprofit 
organizations vJhic:h have:-? ju~;t bPen dis;cus~:;ed, beset the 
organizational structures of the producticm and distribution of 
the arts. Today, the livc-e p!o,.-·forming art!;, including orchestr·al 
music, oper-a, theatre and ballet, are for a large part the 
product 
that in 
~f nonprofit institutions. It should not he for·gotten 
the past profit-seeking institutions were appal-entl. y a 
rule rather than an e:-:c:ept.ion in ltH? perfonnin•;J a1-ts; not only 
serious theatre but even sy1nphony orc:t1estras were usually 
The dominance of nonprofit institutions in this 
industry is largely the product of recent decades. In the 
following give a few indications of the situation i.n t.he 
performing arts in some European countries. 
1. Music 
Some sector-s of the music industry are almost entir·el y 
proprietary in form, i.e. the manufacturing side of musical 
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industries and tt1e ~ecord industry. One segment of the music 
industry in ~AJilic:h nonpt-ofit or··gc·:\ni~~atiuns .r.:lF"E? dominant, is the 
live presentation of classical and fine arts musicc Tt1e situation 
is similar in operah The French case is a good example <Busson 
and Evrard 19871. 
France: public sector comprises the R~union des 
lyriques municipaux <RTLMl; some independent companies; no 
private productiorlc 
symphonic orchestra and chamber music: mainly public 
(Orchestr·•, de Paris, Ensemble intercontemporain, Ensemble 
orchestral de Paris) and regional \~E'll-c:levelopE!c:l 
independent sector comprising the big symphonic associations of 
Paris CColor1ne, Pasdeloup, Lamoureux>c 
- popular music and jazz: the private sector is the main 
pr·ovi der (80X.l • 
music recording: hi. gill/ concentrated industrial 
organi zat.i on in the distribution consisting of a 
companies <Polygram, Virgin, Erato, CBS etc.). 
2. Theatrical performance: live theatrical performance is neatly 
segmented and divided among the nonprofit and profit-seeking 
sector. The most ar··ti sti call y dynamic S£octor· of the theatre 
industry is the resident stage of which the form is often 
nonprofit. Some ad-hoc figures may indicate this segmentation in 
a few European countries (Laurent 1985, Jaumain 1987, Muti 1987). 
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France 119851• - ~ublic sector: 5 national theatres (of which 4 
in Paris: la CcHnedi;o. Fr·ansai!;;<?, 1 'Udeon, le Th<~atr-c?. Chaillut, 
Theatre de l'Est parisien et le Th~atre de Strasbuurgl, 401.. 
le 
of 
total subsidy; 32 nationa]. d~ama centres Ci.e. private law, 
contract with the state, 201.. earned income>; 
pr~i. vate s;(::c:tclr· about 50 theatres, nearly all 
situated in Paris. 
independent sectcw: among the mor·e tha.n 
thousand professional or semi-~rofessional independent theatre 
companies !'I 435 groups received subsidies in 1985 (only 272 in 
1987). A dist:i.nct:i.on i.s made? betv1een the 1.40 thr~atre gr-rJups "hors 
commission", whi eh nr,goti a tee thei , .. conventi ems di.r-ectl Y with the 
Direction o·f Theatre and tile more than 300 groups "en 
commission", of which tt1e projects are evaluated by an advisory 
board. 
FRG.: In the 1984/85 season there were 87 public theatres 
CStaatstheater,Stadttheater, Stadtebundtheater and Landestheater) 
which received 97% of the subsidies and 80 private theatres; 
audience 6 mil vs. 4.4 mil. 
public theatre is financed by the Arts Councils. A 
distinction is made between regularly subsidised theatre groups 
(revenue funded clients, more than 90% of the theatre subsidies 
in 1985/861 and companies financed by project (pr-oject funded 
clients). Tile revenue funded groups comprise two National 
Companies Cthe National Theatre and the Royal Shakespeat·"e 
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Company, 45% of t~1eatre subsidy >, the building based companies 
140%1 and the touring companies 18%1. The project funded clients 
are mainly small experimental groups which receive one time 
subsidies. 
private theatre: 
association of 47 theatres. 
Society of West End Theatre is an 
Italy ( 19851: 15 resident theatres with pc~lic management, 12 
resident theatres with private management, 68 private companies, 
60 co-operative groups, 18 theatre groups with production and 
promotion activities, 118 experimental con~anies and 76 companies 
for children. 
J. Visual arts and ext1ibitions 
Visual arts producticm is primarily corporate or individual in 
organization~ Most craft artists, painters and sculptors are solo 
operating directly on the market rather than 
employees of or·t;Jan i z a ti on~::; n The distribution of fine arts 
is dominated by proprietorship, painting, 
primarily 
scul pt.Ut'-(? 
gall er· i E~S 
more important in the exhibition of art, 
of museums. In the FHG, for c~:.~ amp 1 e!l 
The nonprofit form is 
e.g. the nonprofit form 
23% of the museums are 
. state-owned, 63% are city-owned, 14% are privately owned. 
These few data show that the relative importance of the non 
profit form varies less between the artistic media (visual, 
musical, dramatic) or organizational functions than within them. 
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Most arts indust~ies perform both profit-seeking and nonprofit 
activities: scholarly and poetry presses in the book publishing 
sector, classical music producers f,r, the music industry, museums 
and commercial art galleries in visual arts. This may lead us to 
an inductive sum1nary with thr-ee working t1ypotheses~ 
1. Labour-intensive cultural activities tend to be organized in 
the nonprofit form, whereas those whict1 are capital-irltensive are 
more often organized on a p~oprietary basis. 
2. Cultural activities associated with high-art forms tend to be 
organized in the nonprofit form, whereas those which are 
associated with popular culture are more likely to be or-ganized 
on a proprietary basis. forms are particularly 
labour-intensive, 
for distribution, 
economies of scale~ 
.. ) . 
relatively unlikely to use media technologies 
ar1d are thLIS ur1able ·to realize SLtbstantial 
serve large publics or which are closely linked to the official 
aims of public education tend to be organized as public agencies, 
particularly libraries and history museums, wt1ereas activities 
with narrower audiences or less clearly educational put~poses tend 
to be organized as nonprofit organizations . 
These working hypotheses need of course some qualifications: 
a. Not all high art forms are produced by nonprofit 
organizations. Some segments of high-culture production and 
distribution are dominated by profit-seeking producers: 
l i teraturF!, 
galler-ies;; 
c: l a•::;si cal music ~ecording~ 
b. Most creators of high art are often sole proprietors dealing 
with proprietary and nonprofit firms by means of selling or 
concluding contracts; 
c. Predominantly nonprofit industry segments often taave islands 
of profit-seeking islands within them; 
d. Profit-seekirlg cultural sectors, especially those using mass 
production and distributiorl technologies, have oases of non 
profit activity (e.g. public broadcasting!; 
e. Not all labour·--inten,;ive artistic •~or·k is nonpr·ofit 
performer-s of rJopular music>~ 
(e. g. 
In short, the respective roles of proprietary and nonprofit 
organizations are often difficult to sort outu 
empirical r-f:?seEtrch n!?E~d!:S tt:l b(7? Utldet·-·t.ak<·:~n cultut'-al 
Therefor-e, 
s;ectcw by 
cultural sector to veri·Fy ttle hypotheses, taking into account the 
diversity of cultural patterns in the countries. 
III. Nonprofit organization of the production and distribution of 
culture 
.III.A. Economic approaches to organizational structures 
Only recently the 1 i teratLwe on cultural economics has addt-essed 
the question of organizational structures of the production and 
distribution of culture <Blaug 1976; DiMaggio 1986 and 1987; 
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Hansmann 19811. 'In the following we review the main economic 
appr·oaches '"hich tend to <?>·:pl;oli.n the C:>F"(Jan:i.zc.d:ional st('"UCtU('"E? of 
the production and distribution of culture. 
Baumol~s cost disease 
A first explanation can be found in the works of Baumol, 
leading exponent of the positivist ecor1omics of culture. About 
ago professors Baumol and Bov-J(·:?n 
c;ompt-ehens.i ve report on the econon1ics of tt1e performing arts in 
the· USA: "Performing At-ts: the Economic Dilemma, 
Problems common to Theatre, ~1usic: and Dance'' (Baumol a.nd 
Bm~en 1966). 
The conventional explanation for the prevalence of nc:m-
proprietary organizations in some cultural fields is that there 
are no profits to be made tt1ere. Bau1nol analyzes tt1e prospective 
developments on the cost side by looking at the i~Jlications of 
dif-ferential rates of growth in productivity within the economy. 
In an economy divided into two sectors: one in which productivity 
is rising and another where productivity is stable, it is 
apparent that the 1 i ve PE'r··fm--mi ng <o\rts 1:!<'1 ong tD the c:on~~tant 
productivity sector of the ec:o(lomy. 
,According to the classic exposition of this view, tt1e ar-ts ar·e a 
service industry ar1d, as such, are highly labour-intensive. In 
contrast to tl·le situation of manu·fact:.ut-ing fir·m!!:;, vlhich can 
increase productivity by implementing technical innovations, 
productivity incrBases in the field of arts are limited. The 
theatre, symphony orchestra, opera, dance, all 
can serve as textbook illustrations of activities offering little 
opportunity for major technological changes. The output per man-
hour- o·f a violinis;t playing a Schube?r··t qucu··tcet i.n 21 concert h.;\11 
is rel21tively fixed; it is quit difficult to reduce the number of 
simply order a symphony orchestra to play twice 2\S quickly. 
Arts org21niz21tions operate in an economy which has a large 
manuf21cturing sector. As productivity in m21nufacturing on account 
of improvements in production efficiency, manufacturing wages 
i rKI"ease. Because arts and other service-providing organizations 
compete for labour with manuf21cturing firms, non-manufacturing 
wages are also levelled up~ Ir1cr·easing wages cause tt1e productior1 
cost~::; of ~:\r t. ~; u~·· g ar·1 i z i:":\ t. i on~:; lo ~5pil'··c~l bE:yor1d 
organization can hope to earn~ life perf~-ming 21rts 
organizations suffer frotn a cost disease on account of which they 
require ever-increasing and quar1tities of subsidies~ 
performing arts organizations can use some strategies 
for reducing their productior1 costs: 
They can reduce the rate of increase in their unit costs by 
·permitting some deterioration in the quality of their product, by 
having fewer rehearsals, by using less well-trC~ined performers, 
and by using costumes and scer1ery of a lower qualityn Hm~ever··, 
I I I . such a course o·F actior1 is never popular with organizatiorls 
14 
dedicated to qual~ty, t may lead to loss of 
21udience and community support. 
There is or1e other importar1t way ·For performir1g arts to save 
costs, i.e. through wages paid to performers. The live performing 
arts form a r21ther special labour market, i.e. a market in whictl 
the need for great natur21l 21bility and extensive training limits 
the supply, but i11 whict1 the non-econon,ic r-eturns 
substantial inducement Lo remain in the field. 
the per·forming arts are relatively insensitive to general 
trends, especially in the ~1ort run. 
It is mainly ·fol" t.hic; 1··ea•5un that perfor-rning ar-ts c:wganizat.io11S 
in financial difficulties have often managed to shift part of 
their ·f j, nanc:i al bUI'""df=n back to thr::? pe-:~~·~f DI'"HlE~I'-s and thf~ mc"!.nagt::-=merlt, 
are usually very poorly paid according to conltnercial vJho 
standards. An explanatior1 frequently gj.ven for this refers tu tt1e 
the vJillingnes~:; uf tho~-;e ~·'JC:.ir·k:i.ng ir1 l:t1r:-2::::.c~ ·fit:!ld:;~, tu sac:1 .. - if iCE? 
money i ncomr::.· for the leas tnaterial pleasures of t:hei.r-
participation in the arts. Although t:hen:e an? limits tu tiHeo;e 
financial S-EH.::t"- i ·f i C:eS, excess supply cor1tinues to be one of 
market's most notable characteristics. 
Still some questiuns rem21in unanswered: 
It is difficult to distinguish increases in uperating costs 
from the costs of org21nization21l gruwth. 
b. It is difficult to distinguish declines in the percent21ge of 
I 
earned income ·Ft-om those re·flec::ting incr-F.-:asE~s in LI·1E:a \-'olumE.~ o·f 
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funding available from foundations, 
sector. 
corporations and the public 
c. If one follows the cost-pr·essure argutnent one would predict 
that th<ce per··f ormi ng ar·ts cW<Jani z ati ons \•mul d havte e>:pi rE!d long 
time ago. 
d. The approach does not allow for the dynamic process to be 
taken into account (i.e. ct1anging nature of artistic conventions, 
changes in tastes, alterr1ative strategies for increasing 
productivity, etc.). 
In most of the European countries data and results have confirmed 
the thesis of Baumol. The hypothesis of the rapid increase in the 
costs of life performance has been verified as well as the 
difficulty of cultural organizations to reduce the income gap. In 
sum, Baumol and Bowen~s analysis explains the need for subsidy, 
not the nonprofit form per se~ 
- Hansmann's voluntary price discrimination 
A second theoretical explanation is provided by Hansmann 
(Hansmann 1981). His starting point is the observation that 
nearly all nonprofit performing arts organizations are for a 
great part dependent on donations. This pattern of financing 
provides a preliminary explanation for the predominance of the 
nonprofit form in the cultural industry. But why are the 
performing arts to such a great extent financed by donations? 
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We start with two ~ritical observations: 
a. In sect.ar··s such as education and heal t.h de>nati ve financing 
of nonprofits products sometimes serves as a mear1s to support ttte 
private production of public goods. In accordance with this 
notion, it has frequently been argued that the performing arts 
e>:hibit sub"'.tantial externalities which in turn 
provides a rationale for both public and private subsidies. For 
e>:ample, prominent cultural institutions give prestige and 
bring tourism to both the city and the nation. it dmes 
not appear that such external benefits are a major stimulus ·for 
the donations received by the performing arts groups. Indeed, lhe 
evidence proves quite the opposite, f~- it appears that most 
donations received by performing ar·ts organizations con1e frorn 
people who actually attend the groups' performances. 
b. Another explanation commonly encountered is that donations are 
a private subsidy tt1at makes it posible to keep ticket prices at 
low level so that they can be purchased by people who otherwise 
could not afford them. Yet the vast majority of people attending 
the performing arts are quite well off. Suncel y, it is doubtful 
that the performing arts are organized on a ncmprofit basis 
primarily to provide a way for the rich to subsidize the merely 
_prosperous. 
The situation seems rather paradoxical. 
which is basically private in character, 
We t1ave a service~ 
financed partly by 
donations and p<wtly by reVE>nue ·from ticket sales. Or<]anizatiuns 
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such as orchestra~ and resident theatres do not produce primarily 
collective goods: the vast majority of benefits comes from the 
purchasers of tickets. Yet the people who donate are also the 
people attending the performances. Moreover, ticket prices do not 
the dependence of seem to reflect costs. Hansmann explains 
nonprofit performing arts organizations on donations as a form of 
voluntary price discrimination according to which some consumers 
agree to pay more than others for the same service. 
Hansmann attributes tl1is arrangement to the price structure of 
performing arts production. The considerable costs of organizing, 
directing, rehearsing and providing scenery and costumes for a 
performing arts production are basically fixed costs, Lmrelated 
to the size of the audience size. These costs represent a high 
percentage of the total costs of any presentation; the marginal 
costs of providing an extra performance or of accommodating an 
additional cor1sumer are relatively law~ Consumer costs must be 
high enough to cover the total costs of prodL~tion but low enough 
to realistically reflect the marginals cost of an additional 
performance or an extra menilier of the audience. As demand for tl1e 
arts is limited, however, quantity cannot be increased up to the 
point where fixed costs are covered. In ecor1omic tern1s~ the 
.demand curve lies below the cost curve at any given price. 
So, to survive, the performing arts organization must set prices 
to extract frwn each consumer the value the performance holds for 
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him or her. Selling different quality seats at different prices 
is one means to accomplish this, but there is a limit to the 
degree of differentiation in seat qualities and the strategy only 
works to the extent that people who value more highly also set an 
unusually high value on good seats. Consequently, orchestras and 
theatre companies ask for voluntary donations as a means of 
discriminating with respect to price. 
Hansmann's analysis also helps to explain why through the years 
nonprofit organizations have become increasingly prominent in the 
performing arts. Because productivity in live performances has 
not grown at the same pace as in the overall economy, the costs 
of performing arts productions has increased disproportionately 
to those of most other goods <Baumol 1966). From historical 
evidence it appears that fixed costs have consistently risen at a 
faster rate thar1 variable costs have, and have thus started to 
represent an increasingly large share of the total costs. These 
developments have presumably given nor1profit organizations, 
having access to the means of price discrimination, an increasing 
advantage over their profit-seeking counterparts which are 
dependent upon ticket sales alone to cover both fixed and 
variable costs. 
·summarizing, the live performing arts are commonly characterized 
by fixed costs that are high relative to marginal costs, and by a 
relatively low overall demand. As a consequence, performing arts 
groups often must engage in price discrimination if they wish to 
i! 
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survive without subsidy. However, the opportunities for effective 
discrimination through ticket pricing are limited. Therefor-e 
nonprofit firms, which in fact can make use of a system of 
voluntar·y pt-ice discrimination, Cim often sur-vive in <:weas of the 
performing arts where profit-seeking firms cannot. 
Hansmann's of the prevalence of nonpro·f it 
organizations in the high-culture performing arts is a persuasive 
one. He however takes for granted a conventional definition of 
the performing arts firm, as combining pet-for-mance and 
sponsorship within a single organization. 
Weisbrod public goods'theory 
Why are some non-commercial cultLwal organizations voluntary non-
profit while others are public agencies? We have no theories on 
the relative prevalence of public and nonprofit culture producers 
and distributors among nort-commercial culture producers and 
distributors. The more general framework of Weisbrod's theory can 
be extended to the arts IWeisbrod 1977 and 19881. 
According to Weisbrod, non-commer·cial organizations e>iist to 
provide "collective consumption goods". In line with the public 
choice tradition, according to which the political system is 
·assumed to translate voter/consumer preferences into public 
policy, public enterprise arises when voters agree about the 
desirability of a collective good and the amount to be provided. 
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Under these ci rcu;nstances thE' ab i 1 it y of gove1"nment to ta,., (and 
thus circumvent the free-rider problem) makes it the most logical 
provider. 
However~ demand for collective goods often varies strongly from 
person to person. When this occurs, tt1e governmerlt provides a 
1 evel of the collective good equal to that demanded by the 
aver· age voter-. Citizens who prefer a higher level of provision 
may set up a private voluntary organization to supplement the 
government~s production. Voluntary organizations are then seen as 
extragovernmental providers of collective consumption goods. They 
will supplement the public provision and provide an alternative 
to the private sector provision. 
Weisbrod anticipates that nonprofit organizations will be the 
first providers, followed by government, of any given collective 
good, which will grow until consumers become wealthy enough to 
replace collective goods with privately consumable substitutes 
(ship radar instead of lighthouses, 
air). 
air filters instead of clean 
When applied to some specific cultural fielch; 
museums) Weisbrod's arguments provide some explanatory leverage 
Cin the USA: private nonprofit museums in the late 19th century, 
public museums in the early twentieth and the arts market, a 
recent private substitute). The theory is also consistent with 
the growth of public subsidy to nonprofit organizations as public 
demand for the arts has increased. 
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Still, there is . much more that the Weisbrod approach does not 
explain. The performing arts are mostly consumed privately by the 
same people who donate to the organizations of which tickets they 
purchase. This economic model cannot explain why nonprofit 
o~chest~as, theatres, and dance companies exist. Weisbrod even 
stated that the larger the private goods component in a "mixed 
good", the greater the tendency of profit-seeking organization to 
supplement governmental provision. In short, refined empirical 
research is required to verify the ability of the collective 
goods' theory to explain the specific characteristics of 
organizational structures in the cultural field. 
Conclusion 
The economic approaches tend to explain the relative prevalence 
of different organizational forms in the production 
distribution of culture. T~e Hansmann and Baumol approaches 
explain the preponderance of nonprofit enterprise in the 
production and the distribution of art forms that are labour-
intensive; and to the extent that labour-intensiveness is 
especially characteristic of the high arts, they help to explain 
the importance of nonprofit firms in these fields. The Weisbrod 
theory explains the relative dominance of public enterprise in 
'the provision of services that have large collective consumption 
components. All approaches need further empirical evidence from 
case studies. 
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III.B. Economic approacl1es to behavioural differences. 
1. Economists have quite successfully modelled the behaviour of 
proprietary firms by assuming that owners and their agents seek 
to maximize profits and have sufficient information on and 
control over other participants for the firm to behave in a 
profit-maximizing manner. Therefore, it has been natural for 
economic models of nonprofit firms, including cultural 
organizations, to start by making certain assumptions about 
the goals, or objective functions, of these organizations and to 
adapt conventional models of firms to so as to predict thei~ 
behaviour !Hendon & others 1980, Hendon & Shanahan 19831. 
Presumably profit maximization is excluded as ar1 objective for 
~y legitimate nonprofit organization; consequently, the 
organization must select other goals. This choice of goals may 
lie with one or several individuals or groups, including 
performers, directors, producer·s, professior1al managers, artd 
donors. 
Nearly all economic models have stated that nonprofit cultural 
organizations try to maximize two goals, i.e. artistic quality 
and the size of tire audience !Baumol and Bowen 1966; Hansmann 
1981; Montias 1983; Throsby and Withers 19791. The models then 
attempt to predict the behaviour of nonprofit firms by analyzing 
how a joint quality and audience maximizer would behave under the 
constraints to which cultural organizations are subject; or they 
I 
l l 
I 
I 
,I' 
I; 
I 
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con side,·- the w~lfare cor1sequences of pLu'~sui ng differ·ent 
objectives consistent with nonprofit status. 
A central point of such models has been the trade-off between 
quality and quantity. In gF:?n(~:?l'~~:\1 ~ econo1nists agree that the 
quality-··ma~:imizing cultut·-r.? pt···oduc:F.:t- v.Jill hE:\Ve smc\llel'- audiences 
or fewer performances than either the audience-maximizing non-
profit or the proprietary profit maximizer, 
audience-maximizing arts nonprofit will have lower ticket prices 
and more performances than either the quality maximizer or the 
profit-seeking cultural fir·ma Still~ some cultural economists are 
about such a positivist approach because of its 
abstraction from the cultural setting in which such organizations 
operate • A number of them CDiMaggio 1987; Hansmcmn 1981; 
and Pommereh11e 1980) t1ave suggested a variety of additional 
objectives likely to influence the behaviour of nonprofit 
cultural organizations. 
Variety of objectives 
Because of the centrality of objectives to economic models, it 
may be useful to briefly consider the main goals of nonprofit 
arts organizations, confr·onti ng the economists' assumptions about 
~hese goals with evidence from case studies. 
a. Quality 
Economists have distinguished between two kinds of artistic 
quality, i.e. innovation and production values (i.e. "virtuoso" 
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performance, stage settings etc.). Nonpr·of it 
cultural organizations will attempt to maximize quality in one or 
both types of quality. Concerning the quality objective there are 
also differences among organizationally employed artists, ofte11 
depending on the size ~f the organizations. In fact, 
organizations vary both in the objectives of their boards, 
managers ar1d artistic directors ar1d in the power each of these 
has in relation to the others. If we consider boards of trustees 
as the ultimate decision-making authorities in the nonprofit 
field, the goals of the trustees are the dominant factors in 
establishing the objective function. 
b. Size of the audience 
With few e;: cept i IJns, mo£it r'ctmomi sts have assumed that nonpro·f it 
arts providers prefer large audiences not simply for fiscal 
reasons but as ends in themselves, and that consequently they set 
ticket p1·· ices l o~Jer and pruvi de mon2 perfm .. ·mances than ~~uul d an 
optimizing proprietary firm would. A number of economists also 
assume that arts organizations seek a broad and socially 
heterogeneous audience. 
In fact, little evidence supports this view, and considerable 
evidence suggests that must decision-makers in nonprofit arts 
.organizations have a more complex and often ambivalent attitude 
toward their audiences. This ambivalence is must marked among 
trustees, the policy-makers fur the nunprufit firm. 
c. Survival and legitimacy 
Economists have assumed that the nonprofit arts firm attempts to 
survive; still they paid little attention to the complex non-
market determinants of survival in a grants economy, especially 
the importance of organizaticmal legitimacy. By contr-ast, case 
studies on nonprofit arts organizations stress the efforts of 
their managers to establish the organizations as legitimate 
institutions within the local cultural community. 
~. Stability of objective functions 
There is also some evidence that the objective fLmctions of 
individual arts organizations are not always stable. They may 
even change in the course of the life cycle of the nonprofit 
cultur-al cn-·gan i zat i t:Jn. In the short run, like 
managers of other organizations, switch their attention from goal 
to goal as various problems arise. t1or .. er.>ver·, large ar-·ts 
organizations avoid explicit trade-offs between objectives by 
confer-ring 
subunits. 
responsibility for different goals on different 
In museums, for e:.:ample, directors may seek to maximize the 
museum's 
profession, 
historical 
adhet-ence to standards promoted by the museum 
curators may do the same with respect to the 
value of exhibits, membership staff with respect to 
the number of popular exhibitions, and the educators with respect 
to the museum's commitment to public service. 
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4. Ambiguity of objective functions 
The objectives of nonprofit cultural organization are likely to 
be ambiguous as well as varied~ It is questionable as to what 
extent major decisions by such organizations are best described 
as goal-directed. Moreover, official goals are so abstract as to 
admit to ar·1y number of Indeed, the ambiguity 
of goals pertnits par-ticipants vJi. tl··, vJi. del y differing 
intet-pr·etati.ons to coe:.:icst pc?c,cefully in the same or-ganizations. 
Case studies of nonprofit cultural organizations put forward four 
major factors influencing the objectives such organizations 
pursue: 
1. Size ancl <oa•·-ket orientat:lcm~ 
Large organizatior1s tend ·to be averse to risks: they have high 
·fi:-:ed cost~~~ 
actual plant. 
with r-egar~ to bott1 in salat~ies and maintenance of 
Organizations that depend on high levels of earned 
income are similarly aver-se to risks. 
Class versus public sponsorship: 
Tt1e 1 evel of eclucati on and di ver·si t y of aucli ence as goals are 
likely to vary according to the extent to which the governance of 
an arts organization is dominated by members of cohesive local 
'upper classes ancl the extent to which the organization clepencls 
upon the public sector for sponsorship, 
support. 
legitimacy or financial 
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3. Roles and relative influence of artistic staff and trustees: 
have already mentioned the tendency of different goals to 
be conferred on specialized subunits of cultural organizations. 
Perhaps the most important distinction is the one between 
cultural organizations dominated by their artistic staff and 
those which are influenced most by trustees. Artistic directors 
and staff are most likely to emphasize quality objectives, 
whereas trustees tend to focus upon legitimacy and survival. 
Conclusion 
The difference between nonprofit cultural organizations and 
their proprietary counterparts does not lie in the "typical" 
objectives of the former but in the tendency of nonprofit 
objective fLmctions to be more heterogeneous and more ambiguous 
than those of the profit-maximizing firm. 
The implications of the behavioLwal differences between non 
profit and profit-seeking organizations for future research can 
be summarized as follows: 
Attempts to develop a single best objective-function-based 
model of the behaviour of nonprofit performing arts 
organizations are not fruitful; 
Nonprofit cultural organizations have a larger heterogeneity 
of goals; 
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Nonprofit cultural organizations also display a larger 
ambiguity with obvious consequences for the internal political 
systems and decision-making processes; 
- Little theory and few data analyses relevant to the question of 
the differences between nonprofit and public cultural 
organizations exist; 
The most important differences between nonprofit and 
proprietary enterprises may be at the industry level. 
The cultural context in which nonprofit cultural organizations 
operate is a dominant factor in analyzing their behaviour. 
IV. An Agenda for Research 
I would like to end my presentation by indicating a few research 
possibilities in the study on the nonprofit organization in the 
production and distribution of culture. Further research needs to 
be undertaken at the conceptual level in order to qualify the 
economic theories of nonprofit organizatior1 in their application 
to the cultural sector. A critical assessment may probably add 
explanatory power to the prevalence of nonprofit organizations in 
the cultural sector. 
An interesting conceptual dimension which may be added to this 
'direction of research is the segmentation of specific cultural 
industries between profit-seeking and nonprofit sectors. It may 
be that the more fundamental differences between nonprofit and 
profit-seeking cultural organizations lie in differences between 
'I 
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industries which ~re predominantly profit-seeking and industries 
which are predominantly nonprofit: 
Firms in nonprofit industries buy the artist's time, whereas 
those in profit-seeking industries purchase the ar~tisf' s 
products; 
Firms in nonprofit cultural industries are characterized by 
ambiguous success criteria, whereas profit-seeking culture 
producers rely on market criteria for evaluation of success; 
- In nonprofit cultural industries, the lack of market criteria 
of success, the importance of aesthetic ideologies, and the 
significant role of class and status in governance tend to create 
a situation conducive to the maintenance of small markets for 
specialized genres. 
Empirical research in this field should focus on the behavioural 
differences between profit and nonprofit organizations, mainly in 
relation to the variety and ambiguity of objectives taking into 
account the specific cultural context. Case studies should be 
undertaken of some specific nonprofit cultural organizations in 
order to add empirical evidence to the theoretical approaches or 
to qualify their conclusions. They should analyze factors that 
influence the objectives of nonprofit cultural organizations 
<such as size, financing, influence of artistic staff and 
trustees, market dependence etc.) in relation to their output. 
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In this of conceptual and empirical resear·c::h 
possibilities, the study on foundations, i.e. nonprofit cultural 
organizations which are important in the production, distribution 
and promotion of culture, could be very challenging. In view of 
the changing p~tterns of financing culture (i.e. increased 
sponsorship and uncertain growth prospects of p~~lic support) and 
of the consequences of the realization of the internal 
(i.e. f i seal hannoni zati on I on the cultural sector in the 
different countries of the European Community, conceptual 
rersear·ch (i.e. are foundations private producers of collective 
consumption goods?) as well as empirical research (i.e. the study 
of specific cultural foundations in reference to their role and 
behavioLwl could be undertaken. 
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1. Market failures and similar shortcomings of 
the State in solving given social problems draw 
the political and theoretical attention to 
something else beyond markets and the State. It 
is the capacity of this "third sector" in ful-
filling societal demands which cannot be ade-
quately satisfied by markets and/or State, 
which is of most interest in this context. 
The discussion on this "third sector" is quite 
an international one and covers nearly all 
areas of policy ranging from education, health 
and welfare to culture policy and also develop-
ment aid. This indicates that the search for 
alternative or complementary forms of societal 
guidance beyond markets and the State goes back 
to similiar problems in many countries of the 
world, at least in the advanced western coun-
tries, in that, this issue is not typical only 
for one special policy field, but also can be 
generalized in this sense. 
This trend of shifting interests towards non-
etatistic and non-market strategies of inter-
vention is also obvious in the policy field of 
development aid. Here, the heavy criticism of 
state-run development aid and the nonfunctio-
ning of the market in the so-called Third World 
I I I 
I 
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focussed interest almost exclusivelY on 
self-helP groups and especiallY non-govern-
mental organizations and their work, in respect 
of the given prospects but also constraints. 
western donor Thus the World Bank and also manY 
countries set up special NGO-programs or in-
creased substantiallY already established 
grams in favour of NGO-work (Cernea 1988, 
pro-
Cl a us 
1989). Also, in the last few years, the Euro-
pean community has institutionalized its coope-
ration with the countries of the Third World in 
programs executed by NGOs. This raises the 
question of the role of the NGOs in European 
development aid. 
In trYing to answer this question, we would 
like to clarifY first, what is so special about 
NGOs. There then follows a descriptive survey 
of EC-NGO cooperation and the work done by the 
NGOs. In the subsequent section, we examine the 
reasons for this cooperation and finally, we 
make certain observations which still need to 
be evaluated empirically. 
2. It is not easy to define NGOs. The term 
"nongovernmental" draws attention to the juri-
dical difference between, on the one hand, 
governmental organizations in the form of state 
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administrations, ministeries etc., and on the 
other, foundations, firms and corporations 
having a legally private form. Yet the term is 
not very satisfactorY for describing what is 
meant. First of all, there are more and more 
state agencies to be found in legally private 
forms, such as limited liability companies, for 
instance. So the legal distinction does not 
capture a clearcut difference between govern-
ment and non-government. We remember, for in-
stance, the literature on so-called quasi 
non-governmental organizations (QUANGOS) 
(Schuppert 1981), which discusses this phenome-
non of widespread private forms of state-run 
administrations with the example of Great Bri-
tain. SecondlY, the term NGOs makes mere! Y a 
negative distinction between them and govern-
mental organizations and therefore provides a 
not even satisfactory answer to what NGOs are 
not, rather than an answer to what theY are. 
The term non-profit organization as an alterna-
tive to nongovernmental organization, points 
more to the economic identity of the organiza-
tions which are discussed here. It also runs 
into similar problems. We learn from Hansmann 
(1980) that non-profit organizations exist 
which make a profit without loosing their iden-
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tity as nonprofit organizations. So again, in a 
strict 
again, 
sense, the term is misleading, and 
only negatively identifies what it is 
intended to identify. 
So, we know by now, that NGOs or non-profit 
organizations are neither State nor market or-
what is their ganizations; but what 
In 
are they, 
trying to answer this positive 
question, 
identity? 
we would suggest using social crite-
ria rather than legal or economic ones. In this 
sense, it is of importance that NGOs are con-
nected with society in a special way, and that 
constitutes the main difference between these 
organizations and state and/or market organiza-
tions. Whereas state organizations are connec-
ted with society through hierarchY, rooted in 
legitimated power, and market organizations are 
connected with society through exchange, rooted 
in equivalence of money and goods, NGOs are 
connected with society through solidarity, roo-
ted in voluntary action. So, one can say, NGOs 
are solidar systems inbedded in society through 
solidarity. 
This solidarity manifests itself in two ways. 
In the first place, NGOs gain their resources 
from society in the form of money contribu-
38 
tions, non-paid voluntarY work, and high moti-
vat ion. These contributions are obtained 
without using force, and without the promise of 
profitable exchange. In the second place, NGOs 
transfer these resources back to society in the 
form of donations, institutional help, or con-
crete development 
of education and 
aid projects. 
health, for 
In the fields 
example, the 
transfer is normally between one segment ot a 
national society and another, whilst in deve-
lopment aid, the transfer is normally directed 
from one national society to another. 
Describing NGOs as solidar systems does not 
mean that their internal organization is neces-
sarily structured through solidarity. Organiza-
tions, always formally institutionalized, are 
grounded on hierarchy and so also are NGOs in 
their internal 
the connections 
and not 
Solidarity describes reality. 
of these organizations to so-
their existence as organiza-ciety, 
tions, even though aspects of non-formalized 
behavior and working styles draw on solidarity 
as an attitude. 
NGOs are not NGOs. Even though they are all 
solidar systems, their standing and performance 
varies greatly. Leaving other forms such as 
I 
I. 
'' 
., 
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quasi-non-governmental organizations or 
quasi-non-profit organizations aside, NGOs vary 
in terms of their programs, size., organizatio-
nal structure, memberships, etc .. Taking ac-
count of these enormous differences, an endless 
typologY of NGOs could emerge. Instead, we 
would again suggest looking more closelY at the 
in which NGOs are connected with society. ways 
Here we can differentiate NGOs which are 
directlY or indirectly coupled with society, 
better with different segments of society. 
or 
It is quite obvious, that· by origin, the most 
important NGOs are closelY connected to, or 
even form part of, established associations, 
such as churches, christian or non-christian 
charitable institutions, professional federa-
tions, and even as in Germany political 
parties. NGOs are in that case, bound indirect-
lY to society via their home organization. They 
have to legitimate their work first to them. 
This might weaken the scope of action of this 
type of NGO, but it also means that they can 
rely on strong alies inside of society. We 
should not forget, that these home organiza-
tions are well-established in the pluralistic 
decision-making structure of various countries 
and this means that a connected NGO can relY on 
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this stronghold. The home organization might 
guarantee a steady access to donors, might back 
the NGO in political conflicts, and might even 
give monetary or professional help. Certainly, 
the price to be paid by the NGO is conformity 
with the demands of loyality to its "big bro-
ther". 
Other NGOs owe their origins either to initia-
tives of individual people of rank and notabi-
lity, or else have emerged from social move-
ments. They have this in common, that there is 
no established organization standing behind 
them which theY can use as an infrastructure or 
pressure group. These NGOs are connected with 
society directly and the overall important 
question for them, is, how to bind a reliable 
clientel in the society on a long term basis. 
Because there is no expectation on conformitY 
by home organizations, these NGOs seem to have 
much freedom of action. But on the other hand, 
they have to take into consideration the seg-
ment of society they relY on, from which they 
get money, manpower and other resources. In 
many ways, their existence is even more vulne-
rable since they are dependent on their abilitY 
to attract a cl ientel day-to-day. A continuous 
mobilization of donors and voluntary actors is 
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a necessity for these NGOs. In the case of sue-
cess, they can rely on highly motivated and 
energetic assistance, of which state- or mar-
ketorganizations, or even 
established organizations 
NGO s connected with 
would be proud. In 
the case of failure, the question of survival 
arises. So permanent campaigning is not only 
with typical of these NGOs, 
risky results. 
but also a burden 
3. In 1976, cooperation 
Community (EEC) and NGOs 
tries of the Community 
between the European 
from 
was 
individual coun-
established. The 
initiative came from the Strafiburg Parliament 
and from the EC-administration in contact with 
a few NGOs. The first NGO program put forward 
by the commissioner in charge of development, 
Mr. Chey ss on, took this initiative to his own, 
and put forward an NGO-program first without a 
juridical basis, and the administration worked 
for two years without 
of the 
one. In contrast, the 
representatives national states were 
against such a program and refused to recognise 
it. The European 
these programs and 
Parliament instead, 
gave budget money. 
backed 
One has 
to remember, that the European Parliament is 
not 
full 
a normal parliament in 
budgetary powers. The 
the sense of having 
more powerful actors 
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are still the national bureaucracies and the 
political representatives of the national 
states. So, in this case, the stronger actor 
gave in after two years, and since then, 
NGO-program has been well established. In 
the 
fi-
nancial terms, EC cooperation with the NGOs 
amounts to about 
the EC spends on 
10% of the entire sum which 
IDF-fund, which 
development aid, including the 
is not part of the budget. 
There are four main programs which are finan-
ced: cofinancing development projects 
loping countries with NGOs, food-aid, 
CY-aid, and development education 
in deve-
emergen-
proJects. 
Besides this, there are special "lines", for 
instance for Chile, a special 1 ine for refu-
gees, another one for drugs, one for South 
Africa and another one for Palestine. 
BREAKDOWN BY MEMBER STATE OF COMMUNITY FUNDS ALLOCATED IN 1987 
Development projects in Projects to raise public TOTAL 
developing countries al-lareness in the Community 
Member States 
umber of EC-cont r i b!A 1 on ~umber of EC-contribut ion Number of EC-contribution 
roje~ts in ECU rejects in ECU projects in ECU 
BELGIUM 77 9.958.515 11 865.487 8!1 10.824.002 
DENMARK 14 2.686. 920 5, 374.478 19 3.061.393 
" I 
' 2 259.053 25 2.916.232 SPAIN 23 2.657.179 
FED.REP.Of GERMANY 57. 9.479.137 12 733.089 69 10.212.226 
/ 
66 8.49?.467 15 735.348 81 9.2:54.615 FRANCE 
- -
- -
-GREECE -
IRELAND 16 1;012.214 4, 126.528 20 1.138.742 
ITALY 46 6.0M.098 10 833.511 56 7.697.669 
LUXEMBOURG 16 736.416 - - 16 786.416 
NETHERLANDS 31 3.994.963 11 608.118 42 4.603.081 
3 386.676 - - 3 388.676 PORTUGAL 
UNITED KINGDOM . 74 10.280.056 17 1.202.576 91 11.482.632 
' 
' 
423 56.607.641 87 5.738.248 510 62.345.889 (•) T 0 T A L 
(•l The contribution to the budget of the Liaison Committee of 472.550 ECUs.should be added to this figure 
Source: Commission Report to the Council 
on cooperation with European non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
active in the development field, wi~h special reference to the 
cofinancing of projects (1987 budge~), Brussels, 1988. 
BREAKDOWN BY MEMBE'l STATE Of COMMUNITY fUNOS ALLOCATED fROM 1976 TO 1987 INCLUSIVE 
Development projects in Projects to raise public Total developJng countries a\Jareness in the Community Member States 
Number- NLB11ber-o EC-contribut. Number ~umber otj EC-contribut. Number ·lumber offC-contribut ion 
of NGOs orojects in ECU of NGOs projects in ECU pt NGOs projects in ECU 
-· 
.. 
8~ lg ium sz;. 4 71 47.655.705 30 1,7 2.302.594 7.4 518 49.958.379 
Denmark 20 66 9.030.916 11 16 667.045 ~7 82 9.697.961 
Spa in 11 26 2.970. 792 6 '8 575.396 12 34 3.546.168 
Fed.rep.of Germany 49 363 46.931.820 21 1.958.444 
1 
44 60 407 48.890.264 
France 86 453 44.901.067 34 97! 3.825.979 113 550 48.727.046 
Greece 
- - - - -
- - - -
Ireland 1.\ 180 8.655.626 5 13 594.721 11 201 9.250.347 
lta ly 53 266 36.559.809 22 ~2 2.049.899 64 32U 38.609.708 
Luxembourg 11 60 3. 572.497 1 1 12.517 11 61 3.585.014 
Netherlands 1l 197 20.9110.150 21 56 2.903.900 30 253 23.8a4.oso 
Portugal 2 4 696.917 2 2 159.840 3 ·6 856.757 
' United Kingdom 61 515 49.045.31,9 41 119 6.192.276 86 634 55.237.625 
Total 365 2.629 271.000.72tl 194 445 21.242.611 493 (. ) 3.074 292.243.339 
l•l These NGOs are active in the field of development and/or in the field al.raising public awareness in Europe. 
Source: Commission Report to the Council 
on cooperation with European non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
·active in the devaepment field, with special reference to the 
cofinancing of projects (1987 budget), Brussels, 1988. 
. 
~ 
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In 1987, more than 62 Million ECU were given 
for cofinancing development projects. This sum 
includes an amount of nearly 6 Million ECU for 
development education. Food-aid amounted to 
more than 109 Million ECU, while emergency-aid 
accounted for slightly over 19 Million ECU. 
About 500 projects were financed with this 
amount of money. (An ECU is equivalent to 2.14 
DeutscheMarks or 0.67 pounds sterling.) 
In 1976, 2.5 Million ECU were made available 
for the whole cofinancing-program with NGOs. In 
1978, the figure was raised to 12 Million, in 
1980 to 14 Million, in 1982 to nearly 29 Mil-
lion, to 35 Million in 1984, 45 Million in 1986 
and more than 62 Million ECU in 1987. Food-aid 
during the same period rose from 9.3 Million 
ECU to 109 Million ECU. So food-aid is still 
the largest block, but the cof inancing program 
has grown relatively faster than food-aid. So, 
between 1976 and 1987 the EC contributed 271 
Million ECU for development projects and more 
than 21 Million for development education. All 
in all, this amounts to 292 Million ECU over 
this period of twelve years. More than 3. 000 
projects were financed with this sum in the 
46 
same period. The average contribution of the EC 
to a cofinanced development aid-project of an 
NGO was 134.000 ECU in 1987. 
Average contribution of EC to NGOs in cofinan 
ced projects without blockgrants 
year average 
size 
79 46.000 
80 81.000 
81 75.000 
82 103.107 
83 111.000 
84 115.000 
85 123.000 
86 137.000 
87 134.000 
Source: Commission Reports on cooperation with 
European non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
active in the development field, with special 
reference to the cofinancing of projects 1979 
1987 
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Most projects were carr~ed out bY NGOs from the 
United Kingdom (634), followed bY NGOs from 
France (550), and Belgium (518). In terms of 
ECU, NGOS from the United Kingdom OCCUPY first 
place, followed by those from Belgium, GermanY 
and France. More than 40% of the cofinanced 
projects are situated in Africa, south of the 
Sahara ( 1987), 32% in Latin America, followed 
bY Asia with 18%. In 1981, sub-Saharan Africa 
received 53%, followed by Latin America with 
23.5% and Asia (16.5%). 
Asia overtook Latin 
America onlY once (in 1982)-
In the twelve years between 1976 and 1987, the 
EC-development administration worked together 
in projects of cofinancing and development edu-
cation with 493 European NGOs. 757 NGOs are in 
contact with the EC-administration and about 
500 NGOs are represented bY the Liaison Commit-
tee (partners for development, P- 8). France 
has the largest number of NGOs who work toge-
ther with the EC, followed bY the United King-
dom and Belgium. 
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Number of NGOs in Contact and in Cooperation 
with the Directorate General for Development 
Member State NGOs in NGOs in 
Contact Cooperation 
Belgium 96 69 
Denmark 42 26 
Spain 29 14 
Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 89 62 
France 162 111 
Greece 13 
Ireland 21 10 
Italy 94 59 
Luxembourg 29 11 
Netherlands 47 29 
Portugal 19 4 
United Kingdom 116 86 
Total 757 481 
Source: Indicative List of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in Contact with the Directorate 
General for Development, Brussels, Sept. 1988 
(VIII/1206/86) 
50 
The figures of between 500 and 750 NGOs working 
together with the EC or being in contact, are 
not by any means representative of the number 
of existing European NGOs. There are some orga-
nizations in the EC lists which cannot really 
be treated as NGOs, and other well-known ones 
are missing. For the ones missing, it does not 
seem to be attractive to apply for a cofinanced 
project by the EC. This is the case, for in-
stance, with German church-run NGOs, for there 
are better conditions for financing in Germany 
while in the Netherlands, for instance, EC eo-
operation procedures are seen as complicated 
and bureaucratic in comparison to the possibi-
lities of financing by the Dutch government. 
European NGOs obtain money not only through 
the EC an the national states, but r.:lso have 
their own exclusive resources; they have access 
to donors in society. The contributions by do-
nors in Germany for instance, are estimated at 
2-3 Billion DM per annum, of which 1 Billion is 
given in favour of development-aid and similiar 
charities (Hornschild 1982). NGOs there, have, 
so to speak, their own "income and are in 
general, not dependent on financing or cofinan-
cing by their national states or by the EC. 
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Nevertheless, cofinancing is an important re-
source for manY NGOs and as such, not one to be 
neglected. 
The rules governing cofinancing bY the EC are 
quite clear. An NGO which wants to applY for 
cofinancing must be known bY the EC-administra-
tion and positivelY judged in terms of personal 
commitment, independence, and experience. The 
NGO must present its statutes and 
complete accounts for the previous three years. 
The EC wi 11 want to know the sources of the 
NGO's income and how the latter has been spent 
in the past. TheY will also want to know about 
the experience of the applying NGO. If the NGO 
is of recent origin, the EC will not hesitate 
to ask the "NGO world" about the newcomer. The 
NGO normallY enters a cofinancing agreement 
with a commitment of 50%, although this can be 
as little as 25%. Joint ventures with the fi-
nancing of national states, for example, is 
possible. Situated in Brussels, 
the Liaison 
Committee plays an important role in cooper a-
tion between the EC and NGOs, for it is a sort 
of institutionalized spokesman for the European 
NGOs. 
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4. Why does the EC cooperate with NGOs? There 
are quite a few reasons. Some of them are, 
in 
the view of EC administrators, as follows: 
NGOs are autonomous. TheY do not take advice 
from governments in Europe or from 
govern-
ments of the developing countries. TheY are 
answerable only to their own social bases, 
to their own clientel. 
based on the personal commitments NGOs are 
of people. It is not like working together 
an administration. People from 
NGOs 
with 
have a very personal interest in the 
pro-
jects theY are doing. 
theY are NGOs are normallY small, Because 
theY can adapt themselves to very agile: 
changing situations in the countries theY 
work in, whether in Europe or in the deve-
loping countries. In particular, 
theY can 
adapt their projects to changing situations 
in the develoPing countries and do not al-
ways have to convince a meeting of member 
the case with other communitY states as in 
projects. So a good NGO is always flexible 
and works rapidly. 
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Although some NGOs might become so in the 
future because 
NGOs have not 
they are growing, 
been as bureaucratic 
administrations. 
until now 
as public 
NGOs can be more experimental in their work 
than other organizations. 
In other words, NGOs have comparative advanta-
ges, 
staff, 
at least over state-organizations, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. 
in 
But there are also political reasons which fa-
cilitate collaboration between the 
Mr. Cheysson put it this way: 
EC and NGOs. 
"NGOs are not bound by geographical limits 
of action imposed on the community: I shall 
mention two territories: Namibia and the 
territories occupied by Israel. Here are two 
territories situated in the middle of zones 
in which we can systematically bring aid to 
populations, but · h" 1n w 1Ch we are kept from 
action for obvious political reasons since 
we do not recognize the right of the gover-
ning power in either country." (European 
NGOs and Development, 1986) 
I, 55 
NGOs are certainly not suited to all kinds of 
projects. In the view of the EC, they are only 
one instrument amongst others, particularly 
adapted to grass-roots interventions. In the 
countryside, in the field of rural development, 
in health, social security and training NGOs 
are strong, especially in the first three or 
four sectors. As a staff member of the EC in 
Brussels put it, it is very difficult for other 
organizations to make people go into the bush, 
600 kms away from the capital and stay there 
for two years to work with the farmers. Only 
the NGO has the capacity to go and work at this 
grass-root level. "This is what beats everY-
thing in their capacity to do projects". 
So far, we have mentioned some of the arguments 
openly discussed in favour of cooperation 
between the EC and NGOs. But there are also 
important hidden reasons which have nothing to 
do with development aid, nor with the particu-
lar case of the NGO. Organizations tend to con-
trol their environment in order to defend the 
given status quo or even to gain opportunities 
to expand. To organize an almost symbiotic coa-
lition with a given clientel is one of the 
strategies of an organization and if an insti-
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tutionalized clientel does not already exist, 
the organization will organize some sort of 
"institutionbuilding" in order to get it-s own 
clientel. 
These general remarks describe very well the 
situation presented by cooperation between the 
EC and NGOs. The EC administration in general 
and the department in charge of development aid 
in particular are by comparison with the natio-
nal bureaucracies in Western Europe and their 
specialized agencies for development aid, poli-
tically weak. This is also true of the European 
Parliament. So it is quite "natural" that these 
organizations try to use every method and oc-
casion possible to strengthen their position. 
The offer to cooperate with the European NGOs 
should also be seen in this light. NGOs have 
built UP a good standing with the European 
public, and have a growing reputation. The po-
pularity of the NGOs makes them suitable for an 
alliance, and weakens resistance by the natio-
nal bureaucracies and politicians to such eo-
operation. So the strategic hope 
ning the institution of the EC is 
and systematicallY of importance, 
of strengthe-
historically 
if one wants 
to explain the close collaboration between the 
EC and European NGOs. Whether, as a side-ef-
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feet, development aid as an issue will be Philanthropic paternalism stresses the sy-
strengthened is a separate and still open stematic inequality between an organization 
question. giving aid, and the receiver of that help. 
5. Lester M. Salamon speaks of four "voluntary Philanthropic amateurism at least considers 
failures", when judging the voluntary sector in the weak points of an organization that is 
general: "first, philanthropic insufficiency; not professionalized. Good will is one 
second, philanthropic particularism; third, thing, to carry out a project well is ano-
philanthropic paternalism; and fourth, Philan- ther. 
thropic amateurism" (Salamon 1987:39). 
The NGOs seem to be aware of these dangers for 
One of the insufficiencies "results from the 
their work. Many of them have made a great deal 
twists and turns of economic fortune" 
of effort to control or even counter these ne-
(Salamon 1987:~0). This instability can lead 
gat i ve phenomena. Nevertheless, some of these 
to ups and downs in the availability of re-
constraints are of a systematic character and 
sources, and this can even endanger the is-
sue of development aid as such. 
not easily overruled by changes in will, con-
sciousness or personal habit. 
By philanthropic particularism is meant the 
danger of too close a connection between a Among the potential problems Salamon has iden-
voluntary organization and its clientel, tified, fluctuations in the availability of 
with the result that a given objective is resources has not so far been an actual 
not the yardstick for action, but the con- Problem, at least not in West Germany. There is 
formi ty of values and thinking between the quite a steady flow of donations to the NGOs, 
acting organization and its clientel. and certain! y the current economic situation 
does not necessarily lend support to Salamon's 
proposition. 
..... I , 
! I 
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Particularism is, at least for the very small 
NGO, a real danger. Organizational weaknesses, 
shortages of labour and of reliable partners in 
the developing countries can bind these NGOs to 
a small clientel which is already known and 
established. The bigger organizations can avoid 
these shortcomings better, but even here one 
has to be reminded that one of the fundamentals 
of NGO-work is the conformity of values and 
goals between donors, the NGO, and it's reci-
pients. So this conformity always includes some 
sort of particularism. 
Paternalism is one thing nearly every NGO wants 
to avoid, but it always exists to some extent 
simply because of the inequality between one 
who has access to resources and one who wants 
to gain such access. Here many of the NGOs have 
done something to strengthen the position of 
their partners in the developing countries at 
least by acting as an advocate for them here in 
Europe and in giving them their own access to 
resources. Therefore, a new topic of discussion 
is the fact that the so called South-NGOs are 
cofinanced directly by governments, for in-
stance by the Canadian government, without a 
North-NGO in between (Schaffer 1989). European 
NGOs have in the past also bui 1 t up networks 
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including the NGOs of the developing countries, 
in order to strengthen their independent posi-
tion against their own governments, but also 
against paternalism of the North-NGO (Dreesmann 
1989). 
Whether there is professionalism depends on 
whether the given project needs it. If a pro-
ject is rooted in expert knowledge, one needs 
highly trained people who can work effectively. 
However, NGOs normally do not see themselves as 
experts but rather claim the role of a cata-
lyst. So an expert is not asked for, but some-
body who is able to support self-help. There-
fore, it is not classical professionalism which 
is wanted or needed but social expertise. Here 
all NGOs may have problems in finding adequate 
man- or woman-power, but on the other hand, 
this is even more of a problem for state- or 
market-organizations in the field. 
Insufficiency in the more specific sense of 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness is the key 
question in an evaluation of NGO projects eo-
financed by the EC (Crombrugghe et al. 1985). 
Even though "there are wide variations in the 
capabilities of both Third World and European 
NGOs" (Crombrugghe et al. 1985:vi), there seems 
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to be a general problem for NGOs in planning Literature: 
their projects and in monitoring and evalua-
tion. NGOs tend not to put much effort into BERG, R.J. 1987: Non-Governmental Organiza-
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LOCAL ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS IN THE UK: 
BEYOND COLLECTIVISM BUT NOT QUITE MARKET?. 
Jeremy Moon 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is the intention of this paper to highlight a ra~ge of 
new organizations and policy processes which have emerged in 
the UK, initially as part of an overall, if fragrr.ented, 
response to the onset of mass unemployment in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s1 The focus will be upon what have been 
called Local Partnerships (the longer term used in the title 
of this paper is simply to clarify their broad pur~ose). It 
will be argued that the particular nature and roles of Local 
Partnerships warrant their inclusion in this burseoning 
international category beyond State and Market: the Third 
Sector. Local Partnerships are essentially between 
representatives of local government and of local business 
organizations. Beyond this, there is no single formula of 
membership (other participants may include representatives 
of trade unions and local charities). Our research (e.g. in 
Moon and Richardson,l985; and Moore et al, 1989) scggests 
that there is quite a lot of variety, as there is in the 
precise nature of activities undertaken. It is the growth 
of local unemployment - generally reflecting national and 
international trends - which has stimulated the emergence of 
Local Partnerships (LPs), but they have tended to broaden 
their activities to embrace a general concern with 
stimulating local economic development. Thus unemployment 
has been the catalyst and local economic development has 
emerged as the predominant response. 
Whilst local perceptions of the national problem of 
unemployment have prompted local responses, this paper will 
also argue that the specific nature and role of LPs is 
crucially related to two apparently contradictory, but in 
practice currently co-existing policy trends. First there 
has been the spectacular growth of State direct responses to 
mass unemployment, beginning in the early 1970s and 
continuing under the Thatcher administration to the present. 
Secondly, associated particularly with the Thatcher 
government, there have been various policies designed to 
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encourage enterprise in general and at the local level, and 
a greater involvement of the business sector in unemployment 
and local economic development. Thus LPs do not only 
reflect local values and efforts, but also they have thrived 
on policy opportunities provided by State and Market 
oriented public policies and by new trends in the ~ehaviour 
of business organizations, without being ex;lusively 
characteristic of any one of these. 
The paper will commence with a brief survey of the 
characteristics of collectivism (arguably the dominant 
economic and social policy paradigm in post-war UK), and the 
place of employment and unemployment issues within this 
policy parad~gm will be outlined. Secondly, the paper will 
present a brief survey of trends in direct national policy 
responses to the unemployment problem- the State factor. 
It will be argued that the implementation imperatives of 
these policies have led to the emergence of an Unemployment 
Industry, populated by a host of government~l, quasi-
governmental, business, tr,,de union, and charitable 
organizations operating at national, regional and local 
levels. This has to some extent have forshadowed and shaped 
the decentralized nature of LPs. Thirdly, the Market factor 
will be presented, consisting of an overt effort to 
encourage entrepreneurialism in the British economy at all 
levels; and of greater attention by the business sector to 
the unemployment and local economic development issues. The 
paper will proceed to outline the origins and nature of 
these Local Partnerships; their organization, their working 
scope and style, and their relationships with state and 
market actors. It will conclude by assessing their impacts 
on the problems of unemployment and local economic 
development, and by assessing broader political aspects of 
the findings. In addition some brief points will be made to 
':'hird Sector 
assist in comparing LPs with 
other 
organizations. 
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COLLECTIVISM AND UNEMP~OYMENT 
It is always important when trying to argue trat s 
Ph 
·· ome new 
enomenon has been emerging that 
strawman f we are not creating a 
o the past. In the UK, charitable bodies between 
market and state have 1 field, and ong existed in the social policy 
we have been aware for some tl'me of 1 various 
comp ex and ambiguous interpenetrations of 
public secto the private and 
rs. It is the contention of this 
however, that the Local Partnerships paper, represent a significant 
new Third Sector development. . Thls is because they have 
emerged in the very area where the 
paradigm of UK political economy 
predomina~t post-war 
- Collectivism - would have 
been expected to prevail. 
A number of overla · · pplng lmages of Collectivism e · t 
offered by Beer is among the best known: XlS • That 
Through an intricate s t . . 
consumer and producer gr;~p~m of b7dd1ng and bargaining, 
on public policy At the exe7clsed major influence 
between the partles narrow!~me tlme, t?e ideological gap 
Conservatives' advance leftas Labour s re~~eat and the 
the common middle ground of thetheltwo partles occupying 
Managed Economy. (Beer,l966:386)We fare Stace and the 
It is presumptions about the we:fare E State and the Managed 
conomy that are cogether challenged b Y the character of the 
developments that I wish to present. It is no 
that, rhetorically at l great secret 
. . . east, these are 3lso challen ed by 
Pr!me Mlnlster Margaret Thatch g er. As we will see in the 
next section there have been some links betwePn f - the policies 
o the Conservative Government . Slnce 1979 and the emergence 
of Local Partnerships. I might as well 
the Partnerships however, that the reality of 
indicate now, 
does not match 
the free 
keenest 
believe. 
market ideal as closely 
supporters and greatest 
as some of Mrs Thatcher's 
enemies would have us 
the one hand We.should now note a startling paradox. On 
thls paper argues that local responses to the problem of 
emergent Third Sector. unemployment are illustrative of the 
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On the other hand unemployment during the 1930s, or at least 
the memory of it 2 was a key - if not the key factor in 
the establishment of the policy components cf Collectivism 
that Beer has pointed to i.e. the role of the State in the 
provision of Welfare, and its responsibility for ensuring 
the overall health of the economy3 . Labour had found a 
policy set compatible with, if not wholly a reflection of, 
the values and goals of its own formative period. The pre-
Thatcher Conservatives, without sacrificing either the 
public institutional arrangements or the protected position 
of capital to both of which they were broadly committed, 
moved to a position which accepted that mass unemployment 
could never be allowed to be repeated. It had become the 
established political wisdom that mass unemployment would 
spell electoral dis2ster for any British government. 
Interestingly, the electoral spoils of Collectivism were 
shared by the parties in the post-war period4 . 
Unemployment and beliefs about unemployment had come then to 
assume a pivotal position in the nature of Collectivism. 
The Managed Economy was designed to prevent its return on a 
mass level. The Welfare State was designed to protect the 
citizen from short term periods of unemployment, from the 
consequences of absence from employment through reasons of 
ill health or injury, and from adverse consequences of 
withdrawing from employment because of aging and retirement. 
THE STATE AND MASS UNEMPLOYMENT: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE 
UNEMPLOYMENT INDUSTRY 
As is now well known, in recent years the UK has suffered 
dramatically high levels of unemployment, rising to over 3 
million (almost 14% of the workforce) in 19835 . The 
central institutional focus for public policy responses to 
UK mass unemployment since its formation by the Heath 
Conservative government of 1973, has been the Manpower 
Services Cornmission 6 (MSC). This was a quintessentially 
Collectivist creation, verging almost on a Corporatist 
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institution. The then Secretary of State for Employment 
introduced the MSC to Parliament in the following terms; 
... the government attach great importan~e to what has 
become known as the tripartite approach ... as is shown 
by the proposed membership ... I am not suggesting that 
they (the board members) are mandated or delegates who 
must refer back on every major point, but they must 
carry the confidence of the organizsat~ons which helped 
them to be appointed in carrying ~ut their daily 
functions' (Hansard Vol.852 Col.ll44-1145, 1973). 
Thus responsibility for policy formation in this field was 
shared priffiarily with representatives from the trade unions 
and from business organizations, though also with 
representatives of local government, voluntary and 
educational organizations. As unemployment figures 
spiralled during the 1970s and early 1980s the size of MSC's 
responsibilities grew commensurately (see Moon,l983). In 
terms of personnel it employed, its budget allocation, the 
number and size of its a~ti unemployment programmes, and the 
numbers of participants in these, the MSC's growth was 
spectacular. The very task of providing and operating 
employment subsidy, job creation, training and re-training 
programmes introduced a set of dependencies much wider and 
much more complex than envisaged in the limited membership 
of the MSC board. Here lay the seeds of a vital 
qualitative change; the emergence of the Unemployment 
Industry (see Moon and Richardson, 1984). Quite simply, in 
order to guarantee the implementation of the programme 
(training or short-term employment places for the 
unemployed), the MSC had to provide incentives and 
encouragement to organizations whose business it is to 
employ and train. Initially the local government and 
voluntary sectors were 
unemployed people, but 
able to absorb the targetted 
as the size of the task grew there 
was a need to encourage businesses to participate. Thus 
modest financial inducements came to be offered to sponsor 
organizations, and this not only brought with it greater 
business participation (other corporate responsibility 
motives also explain this see next section), but also 
greater interest on the part of charitable organizations and 
the creation of special brokerage organizations acting as 
inter-mediaries 
organizations at 
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between the MSC 
the local level7 . 
and potential sponsor 
There are even examples 
of government bodies actively encoura~ing the creation of 
charitable bodies expressly to spend public money on anti-
a 
unemployment programmes . 
An immensely complex but active network has thus emerged. 
It includes public, business, charity, 
bodies at the national, regional and local 
and trade union 
levels. These 
organizations are chiefly characterized by 'exchange 
relationships' (see Jordan and Richardson,l982) involving 
the spending of public moroey on local m~ans of ameliorating 
the national unemployment problem. There is a high level of 
interpenetration among these bodies (e.g. in terms of 
membership of governing bodies, a~d of short-term 
secondments from one to another), and somewhat blurred role 
differentiation. The MSC has been able to see its 
programmes being implemented at the grass roots level. The 
non governmental members of the Unemployment Industry 
possess information and skills appropriate for business of 
placing individuals in particular employment and training 
niches. Their rewards vary to some extent, but they all 
certainly earn some financial rewards 9 , and at the same 
time they all enjoy local and in some cases, professional 
recognition. Whereas unemployment is usually considered a 
problem for those who experience it, it has become an 
opportunity for many members of the Unemployment Industry. 
Policy responses to unemployment which owe their existence 
to State legitimation and funding have become characterized 
by multiple and decentralized dependencies on non 
governmental actors. 
THE MARKET AND MASS UNEMPLOYMENT: THE BUSINESS SECTOR AND 
THE ENTREPENEURIAL ETHOS 
Business organizations are not necessarily entrepeneurial. 
It does so happen however, that the increased participation 
of the bus:ness sector in the MSC-oriented Unemployment 
Industry and it's broader interest in local economic 
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development has coincided with ~he Thatcher government 
committed, rhetorically at least to the promotion of the 
entrepreneurial spirit. 
Encouraged by the MSC the major umbrella organization of 
British business, the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI), created the CBI Special Progra~~es Unit (CBI SPU) in 
1980. This was designed to assist the MSC in finding work 
experience opportunities for the young unemployed under the 
Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) 10 . It mainly consisted 
of about 50 secondees from companies who encouraged firms 
(at the local and national levels) to participate in YOP. 
CBI SPU subsequently claimed responsibility for large 
numbers of placings under this and other such schemes. The 
CBI SPU was also responsible for the instigation of one of 
the formative stages in the development of the LP movement, 
the Community Action Programmes (CAPs). These CAPs 
consis~ed of Town Studies in twenty or so areas of high 
unemployment, whose purpose was to identify gaps and 
opportunities for business creation and expansion. The Town 
Studies were usually followed up with the secondment of a 
businessman to the locality with the brief the actively 
encourage such business developments and employment 
creation. Just as important perhaps, was the CBI SPU's role 
in contributing to the marked increase in Corporate 
Responsibility among British firms 
The CBI SPU merged in 1984 with another organization, 
Business in the Community (BIC), which was formed in 1980, 
and whose main activity was the stimulation of Local 
Enterprise Trusts another precursor of our more general 
category, Local Partnerships. These to were designed to 
galvanise local organizations into concerted action through 
the creation of employment in new businesses. BIC 
encouraged, advised, and supported (usually in the provision 
of secondments) the Trusts, which mainly consisted of local 
business people, local government officials, and other local 
prominent actors e.g. trade unionists, representatives of 
charitable bodies. 
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There has then been a notable increase in Corporate 
Responsibility, which has proved highly significant in the 
emergence of LPs. It is just worth our pausing to ask 'what 
has prompted this trend?'. we should also note that this 
trend is not confined to the issue areas that concern us, 
but also that the levels of commitment in the broad social 
responsibility fields vary enormously among firms. It is 
certainly no coincidence that the shift has occu~red under a 
Conservative government, and ministers have certainly tried 
to encourage the business sector to become thus active. 
This alone is too simplistic an explanation, however. There 
has been other peer group pressure from such notables as the 
Prince of Wales and the Governor of the Bank of England, and 
there are rewards for company chairmen in the Honours List. 
Again this explanation hardly captures the momentum that has 
gathered. There is some evidence that the urban riots of 
1981 acted as something of a spur to action; as the 
Economist observed (20.2.82) major retailing companies have 
come to recognise that 'a healthy high street depends on 
healthy back streets'. A 1981 CBI document also revealed 
that companies had an incentive to find solutions to social 
problems, otherwise governments might do so in a way which 
was more costly to employers. This rings of the Beesley and 
Evans (1978) argument that corporate social responsibility 
is about system maintenance in the face of environmental 
change. In the case of the provision of secondees to LPs, 
often firms are taking advantage of the opportunity to 
broaden the experiences of their future managers, whereas in 
other cases secondments provide an alternative to early 
retirement for middle level personnel. Whatever the precise 
motives the business activities we have identified are 
consistent with the observation of Kempner et al (1974) of a 
'paradigm shift' in the mode of interaction between the 
business corporation and society for the integration of 
private action and social goods, without the need for 
central social decision-making. 
This brings us to the second component of this Market 
factor, the conspicuous encouragement of entrepreneurship. 
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The change in government 1979 marked a clear shift in favour 
of the encouragement of business and of business creation. 
The costs of employing people have been reduced in the form 
of the decrease in the employers' contribution to National 
Insurance, and other tax burdens on small businesses have 
been lifted. Various forms of advice to small businesses 
have been provided through the field offices of assorted 
government agencies. The creation of small enterprises has 
also been seen by the Thatcher government as a direct 
solution to the unemployment problem. Thus unde:: the 
Enterprise Allowance, which commenced in 1981, unemployed 
people were able to receive the equivalent of social 
security for one year whilst running their own small 
business. Enterprise Zones were also created early in the 
Thatcher administration. These effectively relieved 
businesses of paying rates in specified areas of high 
unemployment. Various other forms of deregulation have been 
introduced to try to assist business and the creation of 
enterprise. There has been the Business Expansion Scheme 
which subsidises approved expansion of small business 
activities. Space does not permit a detailed assessment of 
these initiatives. In general it is true to say that 
individually they have not achieved the specified goals. 
Collectively however they provide another pool of 
opportunities, both for business people, and from our point 
of view for LPs themselves. Thatcher government has also 
contributed in policy and rhetorical terms to making 
business life seem more respectable and available for the 
individual citizen. Indeed, LPs have been given great 
credit and encouragement by the present government. This is 
paradoxical in two senses; first because at the same time 
the government has been making great efforts to inhibit the 
scope and powers of local government, and secondly because 
the support actually includes the provision of financial 
resources to underwrite the the activity of local economic 
development - alone, the market will not suffice. 
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LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS - AN ILLUST~ATION 
In broad terms we have se~n that LPs have emerged from 
Collectivist public policies, from public policies which 
encourage Market activities, a~d from new forms of behaviour 
of firms. There is however, c~rtainly considerable variety 
in the forms that local partne~ships take. These variations 
often reflect such factors as ~he structure of the local 
economy, the nature of the major employers therein, the 
political complexion and stability of the local government, 
the policy space afforded to ~he LP by the local government 
and other governmental agencies active in the area. For 
purposes of illustration this paper will present a short 
profile of the Neath Development Partnership (NDP). It 
should be noted that this is not neccessarily typical of 
other LPs, but it is seen in the LP movement as something of 
a model. As such it throws into sharp relief the 
distinctive features of the LP type. 
The NDP was set up following a CBI SPU Town Study (as 
described above) sponsored by the newspaper conglomerate 
International Thomson Organisation (ITO), and which also 
included other firms, and local government officers and 
councillors. NDP was created as a company limited by 
guarantee without share capital, and it was registered as an 
enterprise agency thereby allowing its sponsors to offset 
their contributions against tax. The Board of Directors 
consists of representatives of the NDP's sponsors, and they 
invite interested and important public (e.g. the Welsh 
Development Agency) and private (e.g.major local employers) 
organisations to take part. The guiding principles are to 
keep membership small, and only those who could 'bring 
something to the picnic' should be invited. 
The NDP has acted as something of a policy entrepreneur in 
Neath, filling a gap left by local government and local 
businesses. Initially its role consisted of being a 
catalyst for new business ideas in Neath (e.g. in tourism) 
and as managing agent for various of the direct government 
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training and employment subsidy schemes (see above). In so 
doing it attempted both to contribute to further business 
opportunities in the area and to contribute to Neath's 
physica~, recreational, and business attractiveness. Later 
the NDP also began to act more concertedly as a local 
development company, giving emphasis to the management of 
substantive activities and the development of new trading 
opportunities. 
The NDP needs to be understcod as both a structure and a 
process. As a structure 
identity; a legal standing, 
process it should be seen 
it has its own organizational 
staff and an office. As a 
as the activity of bringing 
together a whole range of different actors in order to 
coordinate resources and responsibilities, and to create a 
consensus as to how these should be best used for local 
economic 
government 
political 
development 
authority 
legitimacy 
and employment creation. The local 
provided financial 
for the NDP, which 
support and 
in return has 
offered busine3s expertise and access to private sector 
resources for the locality. The NDP acts in an 
entrepreneurial capacity which the local government could 
not do. This entrepreneurial style is not just in respect 
to its activities in the market, but also with respect to 
the way it wins, aggregates and uses public funds available 
under various headings (e.g. direct responses to 
unemployment, regional development, enterprise creation, 
urban development). 
What, more precisely, does the NDP do? A- number of 
distinct, but related activities can be identified, and 
these are broadly typical of other LPs. The encouragement 
of small business takes two broad forms. First there is 
assistance in finding suitable sites and premises, and the 
encouragement of other organizations to provide these. The 
NDP is a little bit unusual in actually providing small 
workshops, though these have now fallen under the control of 
the local authority. Secondly, there is the provision of 
counselling to potential and existing business people, 
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especially concerning t3e access to funds (private and 
public). Another major of activity is the encouragement of 
sectoral diversity in the local economy; in the case of 
Neath this consisted of an emphasis on tourism and 
information technology services. The third major activity 
is more obviously public sector related, and can best be 
described as planning for urban renewal. This involves 
negotiatic3 and bargaining with various public funding 
bodies as well as wit3 potential private developers, of 
coming up with a range of ideas, and of generally giving 
impetus to the planning process. The NDP is quite typical 
in having got involved in training ac:ivities, both for the 
unemployed and for entrepreneurs. The former is very much a 
matter of drawing upon ear-marked national public funds, and 
the latter is usually a more low cost activity and is 
clearly more private sector orientated. 
This summary of activities has been intended to give a 
flavour of the heterogeneity of the LPs' focuses and 
reference points. Perhaps the picture can be completed by 
brief reference to their financing, and again the NDP will 
be used for illustrative purposes. Between 1981 and 1987 
NDP received l.l47million pounds, of which 687,000 pounds 
was from public sector sources, and the rest from private 
sector sources. In terms of expenditure that can be 
quantified the public sector plays the leading role. These 
figures do not take account of secondments and expertise of 
which the private sector has contributed more than the 
public sector. 
LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS IN CONTEXT 
The NDP and other LPs clearly spell 
this is often characterised by 
partnership. 
patterns of 
Whilst 
ad hoc 
activities, there is also evidence of their evolving role as 
strategic economic developers. Whilst the style of 
operation is often more reminiscent of that of a business 
organization than a public authority, the anti unemployment 
foundation and this strategic economic development role are 
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clearly in the public policy domain. All this amounts to a 
form of intervention in the market rather than simply 
leaving it to the market. 
public expense. The terms 
The intervention is largely at 
of reference and the ideas 
themselves are however, more explicitly business oriented 
than might otherwise be expected (Neath, for example, has 
long had a Labour Council). Mutual dependencies between 
the public and private sectors are chrystalized in the form 
and activities of the LPs. The LPs represent a marked 
change from the Col:ectivist ethos which assumed an 
interventionist public sector. On the other hand they most 
certainly cannot be characterised as non-interventionist nor 
as privatizations of public policy. 
LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS ASSESSED 
Layard and Nickel (1985) have estimated that 75% of the 
increase in UK unemployment between 1975-79 and 1980-83 was 
due to deficient demand. Even allowing for the possibility 
of local and regional activities having some distinct 
impacts, it is thus with some scepticism that we should 
approach the potential impacts of the LPs. In any case it 
is very difficult to find reliable indicators of much LP 
activity 
activity 
In any 
keepers. 
(e.g. can we isolate the consequences of LP 
on the decision to create or expand a business?). 
case these organizations are often poor record 
In the narrowest terms they should of course be 
judged by their impacts on unemployment. The 
that the employment creating activities of 
problem is 
LPs do not 
correlate with local unemployment; consider the impacts of a 
single plant closure on the record of a small town LP - and 
this has been the reality for many localities with the 
recent dramatic slide of the British manufacturing base. 
This is a reflection of the stark reality that most key 
local economic decisions are taken in head offices located 
in London or even overseas. The Neath Development 
Partnership, for example, claims to have been instrumental 
in the creation of about 1,700 jobs in six years. On the 
other hand, overall unemployment in the area increased by 
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over 3,000 in the years 1982-85. By comparative standards, 
LPs do prove to have been cheap ways of labour creation, 
though it should be added that the types of job created tend 
to be relatively low-skilled, low-paid, often part-time, and 
in the light industry and service sectors. 
Conversely, LPs have grown at a remarkable rate; in 1980 
there were about 20, to-day there are well over 250. They 
have become a nation-wide phenomenon and enjoy the support 
of all political parties. Very quickly they have become the 
stuff of motherhood and apple-pie. It is difficult to 
predict whether they will be a lasting phenomenon. In many 
respects they look very fragile; they usually only have two 
or three staff, and few have guaranteed finance beyond the 
current financial year. On the other hand they now seem to 
occupy a critical position in the local political economies: 
this raises possibilities of their future 
institutionalization or capture. Yet either of these future 
scenarios would undermine the very qualities of adaptability 
and partnership which have made them distinctive thus far. 
Other questions for their future role concern the extent to 
which they are able to combine the initial focus on local 
unemployment with that of economic development. There are 
already signs that LPs are not able to perform the role of 
provider for societies most-disadvantaged - only its least-
disadvantaged. The long-term unemployed do not generally 
number among the new small business people, nor are they the 
first beneficiaries of expansions of existing local 
businesses. These points lead us on to other questions 
should the State seek to pass on further social 
responsibilities to LPs or like bodies; how far will notions 
of national equality of provision and service be sacrificed 
in pursuit of local responsiveness? 
Leaving aside their precise micro economic impact and future 
prospects, it is just worth underlining their broader 
political significance to date. The LPs are most certainly 
beyond Collectivism: they stand for local self-help sort of 
strategy, and are symptomatic of a contracting out of public 
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policy that we witnessed in the Unemployment Industry. The 
role of local government in the local economy has been 
extended from tha~ of customer, subsidizer, and regulator to 
include that of Partner. So too have the LPs been 
symptomatic of a change i~ the role of business: they have 
contributed to the bringing-in of the private sector to the 
resolution of p~blic policy questions at the local level. 
It could be argued then that Local Partnerships have 
constituted an i~portant part of a systematic reformulation 
of the local poli~ical economy. 
LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE THIRD SECTOR 
Finally, there follow some rather unsystematic observations 
concerning the place of LPs in respect of other actors in 
the Third Sector. 
LPs cannot 
members may 
be considered as voluntary, even 
give up their time and there 
though the 
are some 
volunteered services and goods from the corporate sector. 
Funding is primarily public, and key members draw wages. 
LPs are not primarily self help groups: they act ostensibly 
for the unemployed and for the local economy. 
Like most other Third Sector actors LPs have no statutory 
powers and responsibilities. 
Like many other Third Sector actors LPs identify public 
needs and act in response to these. 
Like many other Third Sector actors LPs tend not to be 
highly bureaucratic especially in their early phases. 
There is some evidence to suggest bureaucratization 
processes in the Unemployment Industry more broadly, but 
little as yet within LPs themselves. 
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LPs tend to act entrepreneurially in respect of public 
d bl . ds This is probably a function organizations an pu lC goo . 
of the former point. 
LPs act in economic markets. 
where they take on their 
charging for services 
own 
This is especially the case 
productive activities (e.g. 
to some clients, leasing property, 
setting up subsidiary companies). 
Another market aspect of their behaviour is that LPs are 
often in competition with each other. This could be for 
public or private investment 
special status for their locality 
may bring market advantages). 
in their locality, or for 
from the government (which 
Relatedly, LPs offer little scope for coordinated policy 
responses to public policy questions. 
LPs provide opoortunities for policy experimentation. 
is plenty of evidence of learning from one another. 
There 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This paper draws on the findings of a research project 
based at ~he Politics Department, Strathclyde University 'Local 
Responses to Unemployment' of which I was a eo-director with 
J.J.Richa~dson until leaving for Australia in 1985. The project 
has produced a number of papers and journal articles, and most 
recently, a book; Chris Moore and J.J.Richardson in assoc. with 
Jeremy Moon, Local Partnership and the Unemployment Crisis {Allen 
and Unwin. 1989). 
2. The d~aries of former Conservative PM Macmillan, for example, 
attest to his horror at the plight of his unemployed constituents 
in Stock~on-on-Tees. Macmillan was probably one of the most 
significant 
Collectivism. 
Conservative figures in the acceptance of 
3. The health of the economy came to be judged primarily by the 
extent to which a balance between inflation and employment could 
be achieved. As the problems of balance of payments and public 
debt emerged these were increasingly built into the definition of 
economic ~ealth. The instruments used were primarily fiscal 
until the mid 1970s when a mix of monetary and fiscal measures 
was introduced. In the first years of the Thatcher 
administration monetary measures 
a balance has been used primarily 
debt. Note the departure in 
Conservatives have assumed that 
assumed primacy, but since then 
to reduce inflation and public 
macro economic policy that the 
there is a natural rate of 
unemployment; it is thus no longer a key factor in macro economic 
policy. 
4. Between 1945 and 1979 the Conservatives won four elections 
and Labour six. If we excluded Labour's narrow win in 1950 and 
the first election of 1974, neither of which enabled it to 
sustain office for long, we would be left with four victories 
each. Both parties held office for seventeen years in this 
period. 
5. The government has engaged in various forms of 'numbers 
game' since the early 1980s having the overall effect of making 
the levels of unemployment appear less than they otherwise would 
do. Indeed the current means of counting, which produce 
a current unemployment level of about 2 million, is so very 
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different from that used at the beginning of the decade ~hat 
comparisons have lost all but symbolic meaning. 
6. It's name was changed in 1988 to the Training Commission. 
7. e.g. The Link Organization was created to earn commissions 
for placing young people under the Youth Training Scheme. In 
1983 it employed 60 of its own staff, and had a turnover of about 
1.5 million pounds. (The Times,26.4.83) 
8. e.g. representat_ves of the Scottish Office invited the 
Carnegie UK Trust to form the Unemployed Voluntary Action Fund 
(whose trustees included public servants) whose responsibility 
was to allocate funds (0.5 million pounds in 1983) to voluntary 
organizations who sponsored programmes for the unemployed. 
9. In the case of some charities this has led to rather profound 
changes in their activities e.g. in 1982 the Community Service 
Volunteers depended on the MSC for about 70% of its annual 
turnover. 
10. The CBI SPU Board in 1982 consisted of senior representatives 
of the following organizations; Metal Box PLC, the CBI, Z.Brierly 
PLC, International Thomson PLC, Thorn EMI PLC, Wimpey 
Construction UK PLC, BP Oil PLC, Guest Keen and Nettleford PLC, 
United Biscuits PLC, Ranmk Xerox PLC, BAT Industries PLC, PA 
Management Consultants PLC, National Freight Consortium, British 
Railways Board, Barclays Bank PLC, and Prudential Insurance PLC. 
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